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SIX4THREE LLC,

Case No. CIV533328

Plaintiff,
10

vs.
11

FACEBOOK INC., et a1.
-

12

Defendants.
13

14
15

ORDER: (1) DENYING DEFENDANT
FACEBOOK, INC.'S SPECIAL MOTION
TO STRIKE; (2) GRANTING
INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS' SPECIAL
MOTION TO STRIKE; (3) CONTINUING
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
DISCOVERY (CODE CIV. PROC.
§ 425.16, SUBD. (G)) AND DEFENDANT
ZUCKERBERG AND ANCILLARY
DEFENDANTS' RESPECTIVE
DEMURRERS TO THE FIFTH
AMENDED COMPLAINT
Assigned for All Purposes to
Hon. V. Raymond Swope, Dept. 23

16
17

Date:
18

July 2, 2018

Time:

9:00 a.m.

Dept:

23

19

April

Action Filed:

10, 2015

20
21

Defendant FACEBOOK, INC.'s Special Motion to Strike, Plaintiff SIX4THREE, LLC'S

22

Motion for Order That Certain Discovery Proceed Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section

23

425.16, subdivision (g), Defendants MARK ZUCKERBERG, CHRISTOPHER COX, JAVIER

24

OLIVAN, SAMUEL LESSIN, MICHAEL VERNAL, and ILYA SUKHAR'S Special Motion to

25

Strike, Defendant MARK ZUCKERBERG'S Demurrer to the'Fiﬁh Amended Complaint, and

26

Defendants CHRISTOPHER COX, JAVIER OLIVAN, SAMUEL LESSIN, MICHAEL VERNAL,

27

and

28

2018 at 9:00 a.m. in Department 23

ILYA SUKHAR'S Demurrer to the Fifth Amended Complaint came on for hearing on July 2,

of this Court before the Honorable V. Raymond

Swope. Sonal
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Mehta, Joshua Lerner and Laura Miller
appeared for Defendants. David Godkin

of Durie Tangri

and Natalie Naugle

of Facebook,

Inc.

of Bimbaum & Godkin and Stuart Gross of Gross & Klein

appeared for Plaintiff.

Upon due consideration of the briefs and evidence presented, and the oral argument of

4:.

counsel for the parties, and having taken the matter under submission,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED
1.

\OOO\IO\UI

as

follows:

Defendant Facebook, Inc.’s Special Motion to Strike
Defendant Facebook, Inc. ("Facebook") Special Motion to Strike and For Attorney's Fees

and Costs Pursuant to C.C.P.
10

§

425.16 (Anti-SLAPP) ("Facebook's motion") to the Fourth Amended

Complaint, ﬁled on November 21, 2017, is DENIED

as

untimely.

11

This motion was heard on January 9, 2018 and continued in order for, inter alia, the Supreme

12

Court to resolve a split in authority regarding the issue of timeliness in moving to strike an amended

13

pleading pursuant to Code

14

Newport Harbor Ventures, LLC v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism (2016)

15

(See CMC Order no. 12,

of Civil

Procedure section 425.16 ("§ 425.16") by granting review
6

of

Cal.App.5th 1207.

ﬁled Jan. 18, 2018, 11 2, Ex. 2, p. 73:22-26.) The Supreme Court held,

Because the anti-SLAPP statute is designed to resolve these lawsuits early, but not
to permit the abuse that delayed motions to strike might entail, we conclude, as did
the Court of Appeal, that, subject to the trial court’s discretion under section 425.16,
subdivision (f), to permit late ﬁling, a defendant must move to strike a cause ofaction
within 60 days of service of the earliest complaint that contains that cause of action.

16

17
18

19

20

(Newport Harbor Ventures, LLC v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism (2018) 4 Cal.5th 637,

21

640 (emphasis added) ("Newport Harbor") (afﬁrming the judgment

22

disapproving

23

inconsistent with this opinion").) In light

24

parties to ﬁle supplemental brieﬁng on the effect of Newport Harbor on Facebook’s pending motion.

25

(CMC Order no. 15, ﬁled May 30, 2018,

26

///

27

///

28

///

of

Yu v. Signet

639—

of the Court of Appeal

and

Bank/Virginia (2002) 103 Ca1.App.4th 298, "to the extent it is

11

of the

Supreme Court's decision, the Court ordered the

2.)
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Having considered the Supreme Court's decision in Newport Harbor and reviewed the
supplemental briefs

of Facebook

and

Plaintiff Six4Three, LLC ("Plaintiff"), each ﬁled on May 3,

2018, the Court ﬁnds Facebook's motion is untimely.

As a threshold matter, Facebook does not argue that any cause of action appeared for the

ﬁrst time in the Fourth Amended Complaint, and it therefore had no earlier opportunity to bring this
motion. Instead, Facebook requests the Court exercise its discretionary relief to consider this motion
on the merits. Facebook is correct that the Court has discretion to permit a late motion.
(§ 425.16, subd. (f). See Newport Harbor, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 645; Hearing Transcript, p. 7:15-

20, 10:16

—

11:8.)

10

Although the parties have each requested that the Court rule on Facebook's motion on the

11

merits (Hearing Transcript, p. 35:20 — 36:5, 36:21-3726, 38:24-26), the Court exercises its discretion

12

in denying hearing this late motion on the merits.

13

The overarching objective

of the anti—SLAPP

statute is to prevent and deter lawsuits

chilling speech and petition rights. Because these meritless lawsuits seek to deplete
14
15

16
17

the defendant's energy and drain his or her resources, the Legislature sought to
prevent SLAPPs by ending them early and without great cost to the SLAPP target.
Section 425.16 therefore establishes a procedure where the trial court evaluates the
merits of the lawsuit using a summary judgment—like procedure at an early stage of
the litigation. . . . A late anti—SLAPP motion cannot fulfill the statutory purpose it
is not brought until after the parties have incurred substantial expense.

if

18

(Hewlett-Packard Co.

19

(internal citations, quotations omitted).)

20

v.

Oracle Corp. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1188 (emphasis added)

Facebook gives no compelling reason for its failure to ﬁle this motion earlier when the causes

21

of action

22

argument that

23

Signet Bank/Virginia, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at 315 ("Yu"), is not well taken. (Facebook Supp.

24

Brief, ﬁled May 3, 2018, p. 1:6-7 ("Facebook Supp.").)

25

26

27
28

at issue appeared

in the three previous iterations of Plaintiffs complaint. Facebook's

it complied "with the only precedential decision available at the time of ﬁling,"

Yu v.

"An anti—SLAPP motion is not a vehicle for a defendant to obtain a dismissal of
claims in the middle of litigation; it is a procedural device to prevent costly,
unmeritorious litigation at the initiation of the lawsuit." (San Diegans for Open
Government v. Har Construction, Inc. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 611, 625-626.) To
minimize this problem, section 425.16, subdivision (f), should be interpreted to
permit an anti-SLAPP motion against an amended complaint if it could not have been
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brought earlier, but to prohibit belated motions that could have been brought earlier
(subject to the trial court's discretion to permit a late motion). This interpretation
maximizes the possibility the anti-SLAPP statute will fulﬁll its purpose while
reducing the potential for abuse.
(Newport Harbor, supra, 4 Cal.5th at 645.) F acebook's own argument demonstrates that it should
have moved to strike earlier "to prevent costly, unmeritorious litigation." (Newport Harbor, supra,
4 Cal.5th at 645.)

10

ll
12

To begin with, Six4Three is now on its sixth complaint. Each amendment has
brought with it substantially new and ever—expanding allegations, with all of the
new allegations incorporated by reference into each of Six4Three’s causes of action.
See Fifth Amended Complaint (“SAC”) 1111 177, 195, 207, 244, 266, 282, 291, 307.
Along the windy path that this case has followed, Judge Alsup—who required
Six4Three to ﬁnally drop its federal claims—stated, "determining the nature of
Six4Three’s case . . . was like nailing jelly to the wall."

(Facebook Supp, p. 2:8—13 (emphasis added).)

13

This action was ﬁled over three years ago on April 10, 2015. (Complaint, filed Apr. 10,

14

2015.) That complaint provided the grounds upon which Facebook now moves to strike, where

15

Plaintiff alleged, "Graph API allows Developers, with the consent of a Facebook user, to read data

16

from and write data to Facebook," which "allowed Developers to build applications that enabled

17

Facebook user to search the user's friends photos via a Facebook platform application," including

18

the "Friends' Photos Endpoint." (Complaint,

19

access to the Friends' Photos Endpoint" forms the bases

20

39. See also id. at 11 52.)

21

22
23

24
25

26

1111

l6,

19, 20.) Facebook's decision to "end

a

third-party

of the four causes of action pled.

(Id. at

11

In the instant motion, Facebook argues, inter alia, that granting or denying access to its API,
and specifically access to photos, is akin to an editorial decision subject to

§

425.16.

Facebook made — and needs to continue to make — editorial decisions about what
third-party content is available through its Platform to protect its users’ experience.
To that end, on April 30, 2015, one year after it gave app developers notice of the
pending change, Facebook elected to not publish via its Platform APls content that
an app user’s friends had shared with the user on Facebook. As a result, Pikinis could
no longer access friends’ photos via the Facebook Platform. (Pikinis is ﬂee to seek
direct permission from its users’ friends to access and analyze their photos).

27
28
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Six4Three’s claims, all of which fault Facebook for deciding to ale—publish friends’
photos and other third—party content, fall squarely within the anti-SLAPP statute
because each implicates Facebook’s conduct in furtherance of its constitutional right
to free speech on issues of public concern. Each of the eight causes of action
challenges Facebook’s editorial decisions about What third-party content to allow or
not allow to be disseminated to third-party app developers through its Platform, and
F acebook’s public statements regarding those decisions.

4;

-

\]O\U1

(MPA ISO Facebook's Motion, p. 1:20 — 2:2 (original emphasis).)
Facebook's argument that the theories

of the case were evolving or a moving target and thus

there was no delay on F acebook's part is not well taken. (Hearing Transcript, p. 11:18—24, 12:1517, 13:7 14:3, 17:17

—

18:1.) Speciﬁcally, Facebook's argument that "the way [Plaintiffs] framed

it was not clear that that's what they were pointing to" is belied by correspondence

10

the Complaint,

ll

F acebook sent to

12

In a letter dated May 26, 2015, Facebook clearly identiﬁed it believed the Complaint fell within the

13

ambit

14
15
16

17

. . .

of § 425.16

Plaintiff approximately six weeks after the action was ﬁled. (Id.

and requested

at p. 17:12-14.)

Plaintiff dismiss this action based on, inter alia, that ground.

Based on these facts and Six4three’s failure to support any of its claims, it appears
that Six4three’s lawsuit is frivolous and nothing more than an attempt to chill
Facebook’s valid exercise of its free speech rights to set reasonable parameters
around permissible speech on its services. Accordingly, should Six4three choose to
proceed with this lawsuit, Facebook intends to seek its attorneys’ fees and costs
incurred in connection with bringing an Anti-SLAPP motion challenging the lawsuit,
along with any other available remedies.

18
19

(Godkin Supp. Dec. ISO Pl. Supp., ﬁled Jan. 24, 2018, Ex. A, p. 2 (emphasis added). See Hearing

20

Transcript, p. 2728—14.) The Court notes that Facebook did not object to this letter or provide rebuttal

21

argument. (See CMC Order no. 12,

22

unknown, F acebook made the decision to not go forward with its stated course

23

this motion when Plaintiff did not dismiss this action.

24

1]

3; Facebook Reply Supp., ﬁled Mar. 7, 2018.) For reasons

Facebook failed to provide a cognizable reason for why

of action of ﬁling

it did not specially move to strike,

25

especially when it attacked the pleadings at each iteration with its: (1) Demurrer to the Complaint,

26

ﬁled on September 8, 2015; (2) Demurrer to the First Amended Complaint, ﬁled on December 23,

27

2015; (3) Demurrer to the Second Amended Complaint, ﬁled on April 8, 2016; and (4) Demurrer to

28

the Third Amended Complaint, ﬁled on August 18, 2017.
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Facebook even moved for summary adjudication

action

of the ﬁrst,

of the Third Amended Complaint before ﬁling this motion.

and Motion for Summary Adjudication

of Issues, ﬁled

second, and eighth causes

(Facebook's Notice

of

of Motion

Jul. 31, 2017, p. 1:11-22. See CMC Order

no. 11.) Facebook could have brought this motion at the outset

of this action in order

to stop the

"substantially new and ever—expanding allegations" (Facebook Supp., p. 2:8-10) from occurring

in accordance with § 425.16's purpose "to prevent costly, unmeritorious litigation at the initiation of
\]O\

the lawsuit." (Newport Harbor, supra, 4 Cal.5th at 645 (internal citations, quotations omitted).)

Furthermore, prior to this action’s complex designation, the parties engaged in a number of

discovery disputes where they moved for relief from the Court, including: ( 1) Plaintiffs Motion to
10

Compel Further Responses heard on September 8, 2016; (2) Plaintiffs Motion for a Protective Order

11

heard on October 13, 2016; (3) F acebook's Motion for Protective Order heard October 13, 2016;

12

(4) F acebook's Motion for Protective Order heard on December 5, 2016; (5) Plaintiffs Motion to

13

Compel Further Responses heard on December 7, 2016; (6) Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Further

14

Responses heard on December 3, 2016; (7) F acebook's Motion to Compel Further Responses heard

15

on December 15, 2016; (8) Facebook's Motion to Compel Further Responses heard on April 12,

16

2017; and (9) Facebook's Motion for Sanctions heard on April 20, 2017.

17

This pattern continued after the complex designation on May

1,

2017 and prior to the

18

discovery stay imposed by the filing of Facebook's motion on November 21, 2017. (See CMC Order

19

nos. 2

20

Compel Third Party Communications, issued Jul. 12, 2017; Order on Facebook's Motion to Compel

21

Production

22

Motion to Compel Production of Withheld Scaramellino Communications, issued Aug. 4, 2017.)

—

6; Order

After In Camera Review, issued Jul.

of Withheld Scaramellino Communications,

10, 2017; Order on Facebook's

Motion to

issued Jul. 14, 2017; Order on F acebook's

To the extent that the same or similar issues are raised by the Individual Defendants in their

23

24

anti-SLAPP motion, F acebook's arguments

25

not well taken in light

26

Supp., p. 325-8, 3:28

of judicial economy

and preservation

of resources

of the extensive and active litigation over the past three years.

—

are

(See Facebook

4:2.)

'

27
28

Facebook's argument that prejudice will result to the individual defendants "by forcing them

to either participate in discovery (contrary to the dictates

of Section 425.16) or waive their rights to"

—6-
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is not well taken. (Facebook Supp., p. 4:14—16.) Facebook concedes, "Given the substantial overlap

in the allegations, there is simply no way to continue discovery

as

to Facebook without the

participation of the individual defendants." (Id. at p. 4:8-10.) Accordingly, even if Plaintiff had not
named the individual defendants, this action would still have required their participation, in some

form, in discovery. Facebook's decision to wait approximately two and one-half years to ﬁle this
OO\IO\Ul-¥>s

motion until the Fourth Amended Complaint is the sole reason for the purported prejudice now faced

by the individual defendants.
Similar to the ﬁndings by the trial court in Newport Harbor, the Court exercises its discretion
\O

to deny Facebook's "late ﬁling, [as] much litigation, including discovery, ha[s] already been

it to

10

conducted for [approximately two and one-half] years before the anti-SLAPP motion brought

11

a halt.

12

and inexpensively," especially in

13

Complaint and its decision at the outset not to ﬁle this motion. (Newport Harbor, supra, 4 Cal.5th

14

at 645.)

2.

15

It is far too late for the anti-SLAPP statute to fulﬁll its purpose of resolving the case promptly
light of Facebook’s acknowledgment that

§

425.16 applied to the

Individual Defendants’ Special Motion to Strike

16

Defendants Mark Zuckerberg, Christopher Cox, Javier Olivan, Samuel Lessin, Michael

17

Vernal, and Ilya Sukhar's (collectively "Individual Defendants" or "Defendants") Special Motion to

18

Strike and For Attorney's Fees and Costs Pursuant to C.C.P.

19

motion") is GRANTED. (Code Civ. Proc.

2o

§

§

425.16 employs a two-prong approach, where the initial burden falls on the defendant to

of action involves protected activity,

show the cause

22

the

23

Guide: Civ. Proc. Before Trial (Rutter, Jun. 2018 Update)

25

26

27

425.16 (Anti—SLAPP) ("Defendants‘

425.16.)

21

24

§

and

if successful, the shifting burden falls on

plaintiff to demonstrate the probability of success on the merits. (Weil & Brown, Cal.
11

7:500 ("Weil

Prac.

& Brown").)

Section 425.16 posits instead a two-step process for determining Whether an action
is a SLAPP. First, the court decides whether the defendant has made a threshold
showing that the challenged cause of action is one arising from protected activity. (§
425 .16, subd. (b)(l).) “A defendant meets this burden by demonstrating that the act
underlying the plaintiffs cause ﬁts one of the categories spelled out in section 425.16,
subdivision (6)” (Braun v. Chronicle Publishing Co. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1036,
1043). If the court ﬁnds that such a showing has been made, it must then determine

28

-7ORDER RE: SPECIAL MOTIONS TO STRIKE, DISCOVERY (CCP

§

425 .l6(G)) AND DEMURRERS

whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the claim. (§
425.16, subd. (b)(l); see generally Equilon, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 67.)

As we previously have observed, in order to establish the requisite probability of
prevailing (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(l)), the plaintiff need only have “ ‘stated and
substantiated a legally sufﬁcient claim.’ ” (Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope &
Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1123 (Briggs), quoting Rosenthal v. Great
Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 412 (Rosenthal).) “Put another
way, the plaintiff ‘must demonstrate *89 that the complaint is both legally sufﬁcient
and supported by a sufﬁcient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable
judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.’ ” (Wilson v. Parker,
Covert & Chidester (2002) 28 Cal.4th 811, 821, quoting Matson v. Dvorak (1995)
40 Cal.App.4th 539, 548.)

Only a cause of action that satisﬁes both prongs of the anti-SLAPP statute—Le, that
arises from protected speech or petitioning and lacks even minimal merit—is a
10

SLAPP, subject to being stricken under the statute.

11

12

(Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 88—89.)

13

a.

Timeliness

14

As a threshold matter, Defendants' motion is timely pursuant to Newport Harbor. (See

15

Corrected Opp. to Defendants' Motion, ﬁled May 18, 2018, p. 1:5 ("Opp.").) Defendants were ﬁrst

16

added to this action with the

17

summons on January 12, 2018. Since they were not parties to the action in the prior iterations

18

complaint, Defendants had no earlier opportunity to move to strike. (NeWport Harbor, supra, 4

19

Cal.5th at 640 ("a defendant must move to strike a cause

20

earliest complaint that contains that cause

ﬁling of the Fifth Amended Complaint and issuance of the amended

of action within 60 days of service of the

of action").)

Plaintiffs reliance on Cal Sierra Development, Inc.

21

of the

it is not analogous to the instant action.

v.

George Reed, Inc. at oral argument is

22

not well taken

23

action involved the issue

24

licensor" and not a special motion to strike. (Cal Sierra Development, Inc. v. George Reed, Inc.

25

(2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 663, 674.)

26

///

27

///

28

///

as

of "privity for

purposes

(See Hearing Transcript, p. 33:8—16.) That

of claim preclusion between

a licensee and a
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"Arising From Protected Activity"

b. First Prong —

Defendants have met their initial burden
Defendants' exercise

of free

of demonstrating that Plaintiff‘s claims

speech as deﬁned by

§

arise from

425.16. In evaluating whether the conduct

involves protected activity,

OO\]O‘\Ul-l>

We look for the principal thrust or gravamen of the plaintiff‘s cause of action. We do
not evaluate the ﬁrst prong of the anti-SLAPP test solely through the lens of a
plaintiff‘s cause of action. The critical consideration is what the cause of action is
based on.

(Hecimovich
\O

10

v.

Encinal School Parent Teacher Organization (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 450, 465

(internal quotations, citations omitted) ("Hecimovich").)

In this instance, Defendants move to strike "on the ground that the Fifth Amended Complaint

11_

("operative complaint" or "5AC) "arises from the exercise

of the constitutional right of free speech

12

in connection with an issue of public interest" pursuant to

425.16, subdivision (e)(4). (Defendants'

13

Notice of Motion, ﬁled May 3, 2018, p. i:9.)

§

14

As argued by Defendants, the gravamen of the operative complaint is that Plaintiff "was

15

harmed by F acebook’s editorial decision, allegedly made and implemented by the Individual

16

Defendants, to de-publish certain categories

17

other content" by means

18

The Court notes that Plaintiff does not argue in opposition that any of the claims against Defendants

19

are unprotected activity. (See

20

The allegations

of user-created

content, including friends’ photos and

of its API. (MPA ISO Defendants' Motion, ﬁled May 3, 2018, p.

Baral v. Schnitt (2016)

1

2:25—27.)

Cal.5th 376, 396.)

of the Fifth Amended Complaint demonstrate the alleged conduct involves

of the constitutional right of free speech in connection with an issue of public interest.

21

the exercise

22

Plaintiff alleges, inter alia,: (1) Facebook Developer Platform, including the Graph API, "is one of

23

the world's largest software economies globally and the economic activity it generates is larger than

24

the GDP

25

agreement providing, inter alia, third party user photos and videos (id. at 1111 93, 97); (3) "[t]he App

26

enabled Facebook users to reduce time spent searching through their photos by automatically ﬁnding

27

summer photos that their friends have shared with them through Facebook's network, assuming their

28

ﬁiends permitted [Plaintiff] to access the photos" (id. at 11 104); (4)

of many sovereign nations" (SAC,

11

34); (2) Plaintiff and Facebook entered into an

"[i]f a photo were removed by
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Facebook for containing objectionable content,
been removed from the App" (id. at

1]

it would have [sic] simultaneously and automatically

106); (and 5) "its decision to close access to the Graph API

Data also arose from the fact that Facebook made public representations around its management
user data that enticed tens

of thousands of

companies to build businesses

.

.

." (id. at

11

of

237).

Accordingly, the Court ﬁnds the Fifth Amended Complaint arises out of the constitutional right of
free speech in connection with an issue

of public interest."

(§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4).)

In opposition, Plaintiff has not offered any contrary argument or cited to evidence, but rather
incorporates arguments and citations to evidence in its opposition and supplemental brieﬁng to
Facebook's motion.
10

Plaintiff incorporates the arguments raised in its oppositions to Facebook’s Anti-

11

SLAPP Motion, including the applicability of the commercial speech exemption of
Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 425.17(c) and the unprecedented untimeliness in asserting the
Anti-SLAPP argument.

12
13

(Opp. to Defendants' motion, ﬁled May 17, 2018, p. 1:3-5.) In footnote no. 1, Plaintiff enumerates

14

the ﬁlings

it incorporates by reference.

Plaintiff‘s Opposition to Facebook’s Special Motion to Strike (Anti-SLAPP) ﬁled on
December 12, 2017, Plaintiffs Supplemental Opposition to Facebook’s Special
Motion to Strike (Prong 1) ﬁled on January 24, 2018, Plaintiffs Reply to Defendant’s
Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Anti-SLAPP Motion (Prong I) ﬁled on
March 7, 2018, and Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum of Points and Authorities
in Opposition to Special Motions to Strike (Newport Harbor) ﬁled on May 3, 2018.

15

16
17
18

fn. 1.) Although this incorporation is provided under the section titled "The

19

(Opp, p.

20

Commercial Speech Exemption Applies," Plaintiff does not limit incorporation to the commercial

21

speech exemption, but incorporates

1:22—25,

all arguments raised in these prior ﬁlings. (Id.

at p.

123—5)

Plaintiff provides no legal authority to support incorporation of arguments raised in

22

Other

23

motions. (Hearing Transcript, p. 5521-9. See Do It Urself Moving & Storage, Inc.

24

Slatkz'n

25

v. Sup. Ct.

26

with no supporting argument or authority, is deemed to be without foundation and requires no

27

discussion").)

28

afﬁdavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based," in ruling on an anti-SLAPP

v.

Brown, Leifer,

& Berns (1992) 7 Ca1.App.4th 27, 35, superseded by statute on other grounds in Union Bank
(1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 573, 583 ("A point which is merely suggested by a party's counsel,

Although the Court "shall consider the pleadings, and supporting and opposing
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motion, that does not include considering arguments raised in opposition to a different motion

as

"[t]he pleadings are the formal allegations by the parties of their respective claims and defenses, for
the judgment

of the Court."

(Code Civ. Proc. §§ 420, 425.16, subd. (b)(2).)

Furthermore, incorporation of these arguments violates the 15-page limit. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 3.1113(d).) Plaintiffs Opposition is 15 pages long. Incorporating these ﬁlings adds over
37 pages

of additional

arguments as: (1) Plaintiffs opposition to Facebook's anti-SLAPP motion is

15-pages long. (Opp. to F acebook's Motion, ﬁled Dec. 12, 2017); (2)

on the issue

of commercial

Plaintiffs supplemental brief

speech is over nine pages long (Pl. Supp. Brief, ﬁled Jan. 24, 2018); (3)

Plaintiffs reply to Facebook's supplemental brief on the issue of commercial speech is over 9 pages
10

long (Pl. Reply Supp. Brief, ﬁled Mar. 7, 2018); and (4) Plaintiffs supplemental brief on the effect

11

of NewPort Harbor is over 4 pages long.

(Pl. Supp. Brief, ﬁled May 3, 2018).

12

Plaintiffs reliance on California Rules of Court, rule 3.1110(d) is inapposite. (Pl. Opp. to

13

Def. Evid. Object, ﬁled Jun. 21, 2018, p. 3:9—15.) That court rule pertains to the incorporation of

14

evidence, not argument.

15

Cal.App.5th 283, 291.)

(See Weil

& Brown, supra,

at

11

923.1; Roth

v. Plikaytz's

(2017) 15

Notably, prior to ﬁling its opposition, Plaintiff did not seek leave to ﬁle a longer

16

of Court, rule 3.1113(e).

See Hearing Transcript, p. 56:12

57:7. ) "A

17

memorandum. (Cal. Rules

18

memorandum that exceeds the page limits

of these rules must be ﬁled

19

manner as a late-ﬁled paper." (Cal. Rules

of Court, rule 3.1113(g).) "[T]he court in its discretion

20

may refuse to consider it in ruling on the motion." (Weil & Brown, supra, at 11 9:64.17.)

and considered in the same

Plaintiffs failure to address the ﬁrst prong, including the issue of commercial speech, is

21

22

—

particularly surprising in light of the hearing on Facebook's motion on January 9, 2018.
In its opposition to Facebook's motion, Plaintiff failed to address the issue of commercial

23

24

speech. (See Opp. to Facebook's motion, ﬁled Dec. 12,2017.)

25

both parties failed toaddress the issue

26

v. Yelp, and

27

12,

1111

of commercial

At the hearing, the Court found that

speech and the applicability

of Demetriades

continued the hearing for supplemental brieﬁng on those two issues. (CMC Order no.

2, 3. See Godkin Reply Dec. ISO

Plaintiff Reply Supp. Brief, ﬁled Mar.

7, 2018, Ex. A, p.

28
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36:19-26; Miller Dec. ISO Facebook Supp. Brief, ﬁled Feb. 16, 2018, Ex. 11, p. 66:8-15, 67:9—12.)

Speciﬁcally,
The parties failed to adequately brief and address the issue of (a) whether the
Defendant’s conduct which is the basis of Plaintiff‘s claims constitutes "commercial
speech" under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.l7(c), and thus is exempt from
any SLAPP motion to strike under Section 425.16; and (b) failed to reference or
discuss the case of Demetriades v. Yelp (2014) 228 Ca1.App.4th 294 (which includes
discussion of commercial speech under SLAPP and the assertion of preemption or
statutory protection under the Communications Decency Act (as argued by
Defendant). On or before February 16, 20128, each side shall ﬁle and serve a
Supplemental Memorandum of Points and Authorities addressing these legal issues,
not to exceed ten pages of text. Each side may ﬁle and serve a Supplemental
Response Memorandum of Points and Authorities, in response to the opposing
party’s supplemental brief, on or before March 7, 2018.
10
11

(CMC Order no. 12,

11

3.)

Based on the foregoing, the Court exercises its discretion to refuse to consider the

12

part of Plaintiffs opposition or to permit Plaintiff to ﬁle a page compliant

13

incorporated brieﬁng

14

opposition. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3 .1 1 l3(g).) Accordingly, Defendants have met their initial

15

burden

of proof on the ﬁrst prong.
c.

16

to demonstrate the probability

——

"Probability of Prevailing on the Merits"

of prevailing on the merits.

While plaintiffs burden may not be "high," he must demonstrate that his claim is
legally sufﬁcient. (Navellier v. Sletten, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 93.) And the plaintiff
must show that it is supported by a sufﬁcient prima facie showing, one made with
"competent and admissible evidence." (Tuchscher Development Enterprises, Inc. v.
San Diego Unified Port Dist. (2003) 106 Ca1.App.4th 1219, 1236; Evans v. Unkow

19

20
21

(1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1490, 1497.)

22
23

Second Prong

Since Defendants have met their initial burden on the ﬁrst prong, the burden shifts to Plaintiff

17
18

as

(Hecimovich, supra, 203 Ca1.App.4th at 469 (parallel citations omitted).)

As an initial matter, Plaintiff has failed to address Facebook's moving argument that it is

24

of action pursuant to

25

immune from these causes

26

Defendants' Motion, ﬁled May 31, 2018, p. 1:15-16, 2:20 — 3 :9. See MPA ISO Defendants' Motion,

27

p. 8:1

28

///

—

the Communications Decency Act. (Reply ISO

11:10.)
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Section 230(c)(1) states that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service
shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider.” The statute goes on to provide that causes of action
inconsistent with it under state law are precluded: “Nothing in this section shall be
construed to prevent any State from enforcing any State law that is consistent with
this section. No cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed
under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.” (§ 230(c)(3),
italics added.)

(Delﬁno

v.

Agilent Technologies, Inc. (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 790, 802 (original emphasis).)

The statute requires dismissal of state law claims if:
— defendant is a provider or user of an interactive computer service;
— the information for which plaintiff seeks to hold defendant liable is information

provided by another content provider; and
— the complaint seeks to hold defendant liable as the publisher or speaker of that
10

information. [Caraccioli
1

v.

Facebook, Inc. (ND CA 2016) 167 F.Supp.3d 1056,

065]

11

12
13
-

14
15

16
17
18

19

20

(Wiseman, Cal. Prac. Guide: Civ. Proc. Trial Claims

& Def. (Rutter, Oct. 2017 Update) 1] 4:480.)

As the Ninth Circuit has explained, “Section 230 of the CDA immunizes providers
of interactive computer services against liability arising from content created by third
parties.” [Citation] Section 230 was enacted to “protect[ ] websites from liability for
material posted on the website by someone else.” [Citation] Specifically, section 230
states: “No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content
provider.” 47 U.S.C. § 23 0(c)( 1). Importantly, section 23 0'3 “grant of immunity
applies only if the interactive computer service provider is not also an ‘information
content provider,’ which is deﬁned as someone who is ‘responsible, in whole or in
part, for the creation or development of the offending content.” [Citation] CDA
immunity, thus, does not apply to “the creation of content” by a website. [Citation]
Because a “website operator can be both a service provider and a content provider,”
it “may be immune from liability for some of the content it displays to the public but
be subject to liability for other content.” [Citation]

21

22
23

24
25

26
27

(Perkins

v.

Linkedin Corp. (N .D. Cal. 2014) 53 F .Supp.3d 1222, 1246—1247.)

Section 23 0(c)(1) thus immunizes providers of interactive computer services (service
providers) and their users from causes of action asserted by persons alleging harm
caused by content provided by a third party. This form of immunity requires (1) the
defendant be a provider or user of an interactive computer service; (2) the cause of
action treat the defendant as a publisher or speaker of information; and (3) the
information at issue be provided by another information content provider.

(Gentry v. eBay, Inc. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 816, 830.)

28
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The CDA is an affirmative defense. (Pirozzi

v.

Apple Inc. (N .D. Cal. 2012) 913 F .Supp.2d

840, 848—849 (distinguished on other grounds in Evans v. Hewlett-Packard Company (N .D. Cal.,

Oct. 10, 2013, No. C 13-02477 WHA) 2013 WL 5594717, at *3; La ParkLa Brea A LLC v. Airbnb,

Inc. (CD. Cal. 2017) 285 F.Supp.3d 1097, 1103).)
There is some dispute in the case law as to which party bears the burden of proof
on an affirmative defense in the context of an anti-SLAPP motion. Some cases state
that “although section 425.16 places on the plaintiff the burden of substantiating its
claims, a defendant that advances an afﬁrmative defense to such claims properly
bears the burden of proof on the defense. [Citation.]” (E.g., Peregrine Funding, Inc.
v. Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 658, 676.)
Others suggest that the [afﬁrmative defense] presents “ ‘a substantive defense a
plaintiff must overcome to demonstrate a probability of prevailing. [Citations.]’
[Citation.]” (E. g., Feldman v. 1100 Park Lane Associates (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th
1467, 1485.)

10
11

(2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 655, 683.) In this instance, the inquiry appears clear as

12

(Dickinson

13

Plaintiff failed to raise any argument or cite to any legal authority or evidence to demonstrate the

14

CDA does not apply.

v. Cosby

Accordingly, it is undisputed that Facebook is an internet service provider. (See Cross

15

it was undisputed

16

Facebook, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 190, 197 ("the court noted

17

is an ' "interactive computer service" ' ") ("Cross"); MPA ISO Defendants' Motion, p. 8:26

18

It is undisputed that the information at issue is third party user content.

19

undisputed that Plaintiff filed this action against Defendants based on Facebook's role

20

of content.

21

to user content as published by Defendant.

(See id. at p. 9:25

—

11:2.) And

v.

that Facebook
—

9:18.)

(See id. at p. 9:19-24.)

It is

as a publisher

it is undisputed this action pertains to Plaintiffs

access

In order to demonstrate the probability of success on the merits, that burden requires Plaintiff

22

of CDA immunity

of action. As Plaintiff has

23

to address Defendants' argument

24

raised no contrary argument, that issue is waived. (See Khan v. Sessions (9th Cir. 2017) 705

25

Fed.Appx. 631.)

as

to each cause

Accordingly, Plaintiff has not met its burden of proof on the second prong.

26

27

///

28

///
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d. Other Considerations

The Court notes this action appears to include both protected and unprotected activity

stemming from Facebook's treatment
A

Facebook's representations

of third party

user content as a commodity, as well as,

of access to that commodity to developers for apps.

In this respect, Facebook could arguably be "engaged in the business of selling or leasing
\IONUI

goods or services" and the commercial speech exemption might apply. (Code Civ. Proc

§

425.17,

subd. (0). But see Cross v. Facebook, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 190, 203 (user could not claim

exemption under
business

§

425.17 since "Facebook sells advertising,

of selling or leasing

it

is not 'primarily engaged in the

goods or services" and "Facebook offers a free service to its users")

10

Here, Cross appears distinguishable, as Plaintiff is not a user, but a developer. In that respect, this

11

action appears to more closely resemble Demetriades v. Yelp, Inc. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 294

12

("Demetriades"),

previously pointed out by the Court in regards to Facebook's motion.

However, Plaintiff failed to proffer any contrary argument or cite to any legal authority or

13

14

as

evidence on the issues

First,

15

as

of commercial

to the issue

speech and immunity under CDA.

of commercial

speech, Facebook's representations

of the

access to

16

published user content to developers to create apps to generate user engagement and revenue streams

17

appears to be commercial speech. (See Weil

& Brown, supra,

18

on its website about its own operations (how

it filters reviews posted by the public on its website),

19

as

20

anti-SLAPP statute").) However, it is Plaintiff‘s burden

21

to show that an exemption

22

See also

23

exemption falls on the party seeking to invoke it").) Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to meet its

24

burden to demonstrate the activity is commercial speech.

25

at

11

7:891 ("Defendant's statements

distinct from the content of the reviews themselves, are commercial speech and exempt from the

of proof. "[T]he burden

is on the

plaintiff

of section 425.17 applies." (Demetriades, supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at 308.

Weil & Brown, supra, ﬂ 7:900 ("burden of proving applicability of the commercial speech

Second, as to the issue

of immunity under CDA, in Demetriades,

the Court found the CDA

26

did not apply because "[n]owhere does plaintiff seek to enjoin or hold Yelp liable for the statements

27

of third parties (i.e., reviewers) on its Web site. Rather, plaintiff seeks to hold Yelp liable for its own

28

statements regarding the accuracy

of its ﬁlter." (Demetriades, supra,

228 Cal.App.4th at 313
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(emphasis added).) Although Demetriades may apply, Plaintiff failed to meet its burden to

demonstrate a probability

of prevailing on the merits, given its failure to

address the issue

of CDA

immunity in opposition, or to otherwise proffer any argument as to the applicability of Demetriades.
J;

(See Hearing Transcript, p. 56:24 — 57:2.) This abject failure to address this issue is perplexing given

the supplemental brieﬁng ordered by Court in Facebook's motion as well as the extensive argument

on this immunity proffered in Defendants' motion. (CMC Order no. 12,

11

3;

MFA ISO Defendants'

‘

\OOO\]O\UI

Motion, p. 1:21-25, 8:1

—

11:10.)

Third, to the extent that this action may arise out of both protected activity (i.e. publishing
and depublishing user content) and unprotected activity (i.e. Facebook's policies and representations
10

regarding developer access to user content to develop apps), Plaintiff fails to argue or identify that

11

any part

12

Cal.5th 376, 396.) Accordingly, this issue is waived. (See Khan v. Sessions, supra, 705 Fed.Appx.

13

at 631.)

14

of the

causes

of action

arises out

of unprotected activity.

of user content to

Facebook's publishing

16

user content to users via its website or mobile app.

18

19

20

Baral

v.

Schnitt (2016)

1

Fourth, Plaintiff does not argue whether there is any distinction to be made between

15

17

(See

developers via Graph API and Facebook's publishing

of

Had Plaintiff properly addressed the foregoing in its opposition, Defendants' motion may
have ended in a different result. However, that is not before the Court.
e.

Requests for Judicial Notice / Objections

The Court GRANTS Plaintiffs Request for Judicial Notice of Godkin Declaration, ﬁled May

Exhibit nos.

21

17, 2018, as to: (1)

22

(2) Exhibit nos. 29, 33, 34 (FTC Statements); (3) Exhibit nos. 37

23

(4) Exhibit no. 52, 53, 56, 58 — 60, 62, 66, 67 (Facebook keynote, Defendant Zuckerberg interviews);

24

(5) Exhibit nos. 55, 57, 63

25

nos. 83, 146 (Facebook web pages); (6) Exhibit no. 207 (statute); and (7) Exhibit nos. 210, 211

26

(appellate opinions); (8) Exhibit no. 219 (Facebook SRR) (See CMC Order no. 7, p. 2.)

—

1 —

65, 68

27 (statements and representations published by Facebook);

—

—

45 (Facebook press releases),

71, 177 (Facebook ﬁnancial reports, earning calls); (6) Exhibit

27

The Court GRANTS, but not for the truth of the matter asserted therein, Plaintiffs Request

28

for Judicial Notice of: (1) Exhibit nos. 28, 30 — 35, 174 (FTC press releases, complaint and exhibits,
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letters to commenters); (2) Exhibit nos. 36, 46, 54, 61, 72 - 82, 84 - 145, 147
—

198, 200 (news articles, opinions, editorials); (3)

press release); and (4) Exhibit nos. 201

—

—

173, 175, 176, 178

Exhibit no. 199 (United Kingdom Parliament

206, 208, 209, 211 - 218 (this action's ﬁlings, orders,

records and transcripts).

The Court DENIES Plaintiff‘s Request for Judicial Notice of: (1) Exhibit nos. 48

—

51

(third

OO\]O\Ul-¥>-

party press releases/ earnings reports); and (2) Fact nos.
(Pl. Req. Jud. Notice, p. 16:15

—

17:13, 27:1

—

1 —

7 pertaining to the December 2012 SRR

28:2).

The Court DENIES Defendants‘ request to require Plaintiff seek leave
\O

requesting judicial notice in the future. (Opp. to

P1.

court before

Jud. Notice, ﬁled May 31, 2018, p. 2:6-14.)

The Court DENIES Defendants' request to strike the declaration

10

of the

of David Godkin

11

improper. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 435, 1005, subd. (b).) See Defendants' Evid. Object. to

12

Defendants‘ Motion, ﬁled May 31, 2018, p. 1:1

—

Opp. to

2:23 ("Defendants' Objections").)

The Court OVERRULES Defendants' Objections nos.

13

P1.

as

1

—

70. The quoted language

14

Defendants object to is from the arguments raised in Plaintiffs opposition, and not the evidence. To

15

the extent that Defendants object to the string citations, those objections are OVERRULED;

16

however, Plaintiff is admonished that citations to evidence must be speciﬁc. (Cal. Rules

17

rule 3.1113(k).) To the extent that Defendants object to the exhibits, each in their entirety, those

18

objections are OVERRULED. Separately ﬁled objection should state: (1) "the language verbatim to

19

which objection is made;" (2) "the page and line number and document where such language

20

appears;" and (3) "the legal ground for objection with the same speciﬁcity as would be required at

21

trial." (Weil & Brown, supra, at 11 9:102.6.

22

a.

of Court,

See, e.g., Defendants' Objections, p. 5:5 -6:3.)

Attorney Fees and Costs

As the prevailing defendants, Individual Defendants are entitled to reasonable attorney fees

23

24

and costs as to this motion only.

25

///

26

///

27

///

28
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Except as provided in paragraph (2), in any action subject to subdivision (b), a
prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike shall be entitled to recover his or
her attorney's fees and costs. If the court ﬁnds that a special motion to strike is
frivolous or is solely intended to cause unnecessary delay, the court shall award
costs and reasonable attorney's fees to a plaintiff prevailing on the motion, pursuant
to Section 128.5.
(§ 425.16, subd. (c)(1).) The exceptions enumerated

in paragraph (2) do not apply in the instant

OO\]O\Ul-l>-

action. (§ 425.16, subd. (c)(2).) "[L]egislative history shows
costs incurred on the motion to strike (not the entire

10

litigation)" (Weil & Brown, supra,

at 11 7:1135.

Hearing Transcript, p.11213—17 (Facebook conceding fees are limited to the motion, and not the

See
\O

it was intended to allow only fees and

entire litigation).) "[A]lthough the statute does not expressly so provide,
awards

of only such fees

as

the court deems reasonable." (Weil

Individual Defendants may, inter alia, ﬁle

11

a

it

is interpreted to allow

& Brown, supra,

at

11

721138.)

motion for attorney fees and costs. (Weil &

12

Brown, supra, at 11 7:1185.) "Under rule 3.1702(b) of the California Rules of Court, a motion seeking

13

fees

14

limits for ﬁling a notice of appeal." (Mallard v. Progressive Choice Ins. Co. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th

15

531, 545.)

following an order granting an anti-SLAPP motion must be served and ﬁled within the time

3. Discovery Stay (§ 425.16, subd. (g))

16

With the Court's ruling on F acebook's motion and Defendants' motion, there are no further

17
18

outstanding special motions to strike. The discovery stay is lifted. (§ 425.16, subd. (g).)

19

///

20

///

21

///

22

/ / ./

23

///

24

///

25

///

26

///

27

///
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Plaintiff's Discovery Motion

4.

(§ 425.16, subd. (g)) and

Demurrers

Plaintiff‘s Motion for Order That Certain Discovery Proceed Pursuant to Cal. Code. Civ.
Proc.
.p.

§

425.16(g) and for Sanctions, ﬁled December 13, 2017 and Defendant Zuckerberg and

Ancillary Defendants demurrers to the Fifth Amended Complaint, each ﬁled May

3, 2018, are

continued to August 3, 2018 at 9 am in Department 23. (See Hearing Transcript, p. 4:19-20.)
\IONUI

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 13, 2018

1o

Honora
11

Judge

16

V. Raymond Swope

of the Superior Court

12
13

14
15

16
17
18

19

20
21

22
23

24
25

26
27
28
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